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Abstract
In 1997, the Bank of England was granted operational responsibility for setting interest rates
to meet a Government inﬂation target of RPIX 2.5 percent. As part of the shift towards indepen-
dence, operational decisions on monetary policy were delegated to a Monetary Policy Committee.
Using voting data obtained from Minutes of Monetary Policy Committee Meetings, I show that
as a group, internally appointed MPC members (insiders) on average prefer higher interest rates
than external appointees (outsiders). Further, ordered logit analysis demonstrates that insiders
and outsiders are motivated by diﬀerent concerns when setting interest rates, with the interest
rate setting behaviour of outsiders being less easy to predict than those of insiders.
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2“T h e r es h a l lb eac o m m i t t e eo ft h eB a n k ,t ob ek n o w na st h eM o n e t a r yP o l i c yC o m m i t t e eo ft h eB a n ko f
England, which shall have responsibility within the Bank for formulating monetary policy.”B a n k o f E n g l a n d
Act 1998, Section 13(1)
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
June 1997 witnessed a landmark change in the conduct of UK monetary policy. In a move towards
independence, the Bank of England was granted operational responsibility for setting interest rates
to meet a Government inﬂation target of RPIX 2.5 percent. As part of the shift towards inde-
pendence, operational decisions on monetary policy were delegated to a nine member Monetary
Policy Committee. It is the interest-rate setting behaviour of this committee1 -m o r es p e c i ﬁcally,
the policy preferences of individual members as revealed by the voting record - which forms the
basis of this paper.2 Since the inception of the MPC, the voting behaviour of its members is a
subject which has received considerable attention in the ﬁnancial press and news media - attention
largely attributable to the publication of voting records shortly after a decision on the interest-rate
is taken. Near split decisions often constitute stories in themselves. The Financial Times on 25th
January 2001 ran the headline ‘Bank committee voted 5-4 to hold interest rates’, reporting that only
the use of the casting vote by the Governor of the Bank, Sir Edward George “prevented the MPC
cutting [the] cost of borrowing by 0.25%”. The story also featured an index ranking MPC members
according to their degree of ‘hawkishness’, with higher numbers corresponding to a more hawkish
voting record.3,4 It is even a subject which has come to the attention of the House of Commons
1Herafter referred to as the BoEMPC.
2The decision to shift to operational independence can be interpreted as a means of ameliorating the well known
problem of time-inconsistency: taking the decision on the short-term interest rate out of the control of “politi-
cians...who might bend it for their electoral ends” (The Economist, September 1997, pp.36-37) should in theory be
instrumental in increasing the credibility of, and by implication the success of UK monetary policy. However, us-
ing the criteria for measuring the degree of independence of a central bank developed by Grilli, Masciandaro and
Tabellini (1991) - hereafter referred to as GMT - it is possible to see that the shift to operational independence has
not drastically increased what they deﬁne as the level of ‘political’ independence aﬀorded to the Bank - a measure
associated “with how the members of the central bank board are appointed, its relationship with government and its
responsibilities” (see Table A.2 in the Appendix for clariﬁcation of this point). This is echoed in the words of Buiter
(2002), for whom
“Even operational independence is qualiﬁed in the case of the Bank of England...Any form of pressure
by the government on the MPC to change its behaviour, other than a public, and properly enacted,
change in its mandate, would violate both the spirit and the letter of operational independence. There
has not been a single instance of such pressure in the ﬁrst three years of the MPC’s existence.”
In other words, it is not implausible to suggest that the operational nature of the independence granted to the Bank
is not in itself a guard against undue political inﬂuence. Indeed, commentators of more cynical leanings may, after
close scruting of the Bank of England Act 1998, conclude that the monetary policy framework enjoyed by the Bank
is potentially susceptible to political manipulation. This may be in spite of the relatively high degree of economic
independence enjoyed by the bank, which to employ GMT’s terminology concerns the ability of a central bank to use
the instruments of monetary policy without interference from governmental bodies or institutions. In the case of
Bank of England, this corresponds to the ability to pursue the inﬂation target unimpeded.
3It is also possible that changes in voting patterns may yield information about how interest rates will move in
the future. This avenue of research is not pursued here. See Andersson et al (2001) and Gerlach-Kristen (2001) for
applications to the Executive Board of the Swedish Riksbank and BoEMPC respectively.
4It is noteworthy to add that such interest in the voting record is not conﬁned to the case of the Bank of England
MPC. The composition and voting record of the United States Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) generates
similar interest, where to quote Haubrich and Humpage (2001)
“Newspapers and ﬁnancial magazines can be counted on to count up the “hawks” and “doves” whenever
a new member is appointed or the next batch of reserve bank presidents rotate on the committee.”p.3
3Treasury Select Committee, to which the MPC is partially accountable. The following exchange
between George Palmer MP, Member of the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee, and
R i c h a r dL a m b e r t ,e x t e r n a lm e m b e ro ft h eM P C ,r e ﬂects this assertion:
George Palmer: “It is known that there has been widespread speculation over the years that
the Bank staﬀ are more hawkish on interest rates than the independent members of the MPC.
In May [2003], the ﬁve Bank staﬀ all voted to maintain rates and the four independent members
all voted to reduce rates. The probability of this happening by chance 0.019%. Do you think
that there was in fact a coincidence?”
Richard Lambert: “I am not sure I really properly understand the question. It seems to me,
looking at the minutes, that here were nine people: four came to one conclusion and ﬁve came
to another. I did not get a sense from the minutes that their internalness or externalness had
a bearing on the outcome.”5 (emphasis added)
In this paper, evidence is presented demonstrating that ‘internalness’ and ‘externalness’ do in fact
have a signiﬁcant bearing on the policy preferences of MPC members, and therefore policy outcomes.
Amongst other things, the hypothesis that Bank outsiders prefer relatively lower interest rates than
insiders is tested.6 To summarise the results, it is shown that on average, insiders prefer relatively
higher interest rates than outsiders. In light of this ﬁnding, insiders can clearly be construed as
behaving more ‘conservatively’ than their externally appointed peers. Further, insiders display a
greater propensity for leaving interest rates unchanged than outsiders. In this sense, outsiders may
be described as being more activist than their internally appointed colleagues. All of the ﬁndings
are based on voting data contained in the Minutes of Monthly Meetings for a period covering the
ﬁrst ﬁve years of the MPC.7,8 This encompasses the entire spell for which the MPC was chaired by
Sir Edward George9, namely June 10th 1997 — 6th June 2003. In all, this amounts to 74 meetings,10
a period over which MPC members cast 642 votes.
Having established signiﬁcant diﬀerences in voting behaviour, reaction functions for both groups
are estimated. To do this, limited dependent variable analysis is drawn upon. Using ordered logit
analysis it is demonstrated that under a variety of diﬀerent speciﬁcations, there exist diﬀerences in
the policy preferences of insiders and outsiders.
2 Relationship to the Literature
Empirical studies of insider-outsider behaviour are relatively sparse, and the author is unaware of
any other studies which estimate the reaction functions of Bank of England MPC members: indeed,
what distinguishes this paper from other BoEMPC studies [for example Matthews (1999), Breedon,
and Castle (2002), Gerlach-Kristen (2003)] is that in addition to providing a detailed examination of
insider-outsider voting behaviour, reaction functions are estimated for insiders and outsiders under
5Treasury Select Committee Minutes of Evidence (Q79), Monday 16
th June 2003.
6This may be construed as a test to see if outsiders have a predilection for monetary policy which leads to
comparatively lower inﬂation and higher unemployment than that preferred by Bank insiders.
7Hereafter referred to as the Minutes.T h e Minutes are published 2 weeks after each MPC meeting.
8During this period, Sir Edward George also presided as Governor of the Bank of England.
9In July 2003 Sir Edward George was replaced by Mervyn King as both Governor of the Bank and chairman of
the MPC.
10Also included are votes cast in the special MPC meeting held on September 18th 2001, which followed the terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Centre.
4a variety of alternative econometric speciﬁcations.11 The paper is related to a modest literature
which is geared towards explaining the voting behaviour of members of the United States Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC), the body responsible for setting the US Federal Funds Rate. In
this paper, as MPC votes are modelled as a function of the economic environment, it falls into what
Meade and Sheets (2002) describe as the ‘reaction function camp’ [for example Tootell (1991a,b),
Meade and Sheets (2002)], and not the ‘partisan theory of politics’ genus of studies [for example,
Belden (1991)], which appeals to the career backgrounds and the appointments procedures of FOMC
members to explain individual voting behaviour.
Unlike Tootell (1991b),w h of a i l st oﬁnd evidence to support the hypothesis that “FOMC policy
votes of Federal Reserve Bank Presidents are more ‘conservative’ than those of their Board Governor
counterparts”, I ﬁnd that the policy votes of insiders are more conservative than those of outsiders.
A second diﬀerence should be highlighted. Tootell (1991a) and Meade and Sheets (2002), investigate
the hypothesis that District Bank Presidents set policy according to regional, as opposed to national
economic conditions. I do not pursue this hypothesis. This is because Bank Presidents can be
viewed as providing regional representation on the FOMC. MPC members should not be seen
as providing regional representation, unlike Bank Presidents (Tootell 1991a,b) or members of the
Governing Council of the ECB (Dornbusch et al, 1998). Thus whilst undoubtedly falling into the
same genus as the FOMC, the MPC is a somewhat diﬀerent animal to its US equivalent. Further,
in this paper, the emphasis is emphatically not on the dissent voting behaviour of MPC members,
which is the focus of Spencer (2005b).
3 The Monetary Policy Framework at the Bank of England
The framework determining the composition of the MPC and the means by which it reaches a
decision is embodied in the Bank of England Act 1998 (hereafter referred to as the Act). It is
the piece of legislation accountable for (i)g r a n t i n goperational responsibility for monetary policy
to the Bank of England and (ii) establishing the Bank’s nine member Monetary Policy Commit-
tee. The decision to shift to operational independence was taken by the British Labour Party,
who announced their intentions in the period immediately following their general election victory
on May 5th 1997. By June 1997 a committee had been established, although not containing a full
complement of members. Nevertheless, the monetary policy framework at the Bank had undergone
a seismic shift.12
Acquaintance with the operational framework of UK monetary policy - particularly the structure
of the BoEMPC - is useful in so far as it provides a background against which the interest-rate
setting behaviour of the MPC can be rationalised. In light of this, analysis of the statutes of
Bank of England with explicit reference to the Act is the focus of this section.13 In what follows,
attention is drawn to those statutes pertaining to the objectives of monetary policy, the formulation
11The analysis of BoEMPC member only covers the period under which Sir Edward George presided as its Chairman.
Mervyn King replaced Sir Edward George as Chairman of the MPC in July 2003. Restricting our sample to June
1997-June 2003 means that we do not have to control for the impact diﬀerent chairmen on insider-outsider behaviour.
This might be considered as an avenue for research in the more distant future.
12In the interim period between the Labour Party coming to power in May 1997 and the granting of Royal Assent
for the Bank of England Act 1998 on June 1st 1998, the changes to the framework of UK monetary policy embodied
in the Act operated de facto (Rodgers (1998)).
13Although no previous acquaintance with the Act is assumed, it is expedient here to only survey key clauses. More
detailed accounts of the post-May 1997 framework for UK monetary policy are given in Budd (1998) and Rodgers
(1997, 1998).
5of monetary policy and voting arrangements on the MPC, and transparency.14
3.1 Objectives of Monetary Policy
Part II, Section 11 (Objectives) of the Bank of England Act 1998 explicates the objectives of the
Bank vis-à-vis monetary policy as
“(a) to maintain price stability, and
(b) subject to that, to support the economic policy of her Majesty’s Government, including
its objectives for growth and employment.” (Section 11)
In the context of the framework for UK monetary policy, price stability assumes the form of a
government inﬂation target. Chosen by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, this stood as a 2.5%
year on year increase in RPIX inﬂation for the period June 1997-December 2003. Thereafter,
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown announced a new target of 2% year on year CPI
inﬂation. It is important here to stress that Section 11(b) should be viewed as a secondary objective:
it is subject to the fulﬁlment of Section11(a). The inﬂation target represents the ‘(inﬂation) rate at
which the MPC is required to achieve and for which it is accountable’.15 It is worth noting here the
symmetrical nature of the inﬂation target.16 If inﬂation deviates by more than 1% either side of
its target the Governor of the Bank is required to write an open letter to the Chancellor explaining
“why inﬂation was adrift, how long the divergence was expected to last, and the action taken to
b r i n gi tb a c ko nc o u r s e . ” 17 The inﬂation target should not be interpreted as a range of values, as is
the case with the European Central Bank. Instead, for the sample period used in this paper, “the
inﬂation target is (RPIX) 2.5% at all times.”18
3.2 The Monetary Policy Committee
Following the shift to operational independence, the responsibility for setting interest rates was not
given to a single individual. The prerogative lay instead with the Monetary Policy Committee, or
MPC, as it is more commonly known:
“There shall be a committee of the Bank, to be known as the Monetary Policy Committee of
the Bank of England, which shall have responsibility within the Bank for formulating monetary
policy.” Bank of England Act 1998, Section 13(1)
Comprising nine members, the precise form of the committee is as follows:
“(a) the Governor and Deputy Governors of the Bank
(b) 2 members appointed by the Governor of the Bank after consultation with the Chancellor
of the Exchequer, and
(c) 4 members appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.”
14The extent to which the granting of operational independence has inﬂuenced the degree of political and economic
independence of the Bank, as deﬁned by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), is expanded upon in the Appendix.
15Bank of England Act 1998, Part II.11 (Objectives)
16This is analogous to the loss function for the monetary authorities assuming the quadratic form Zt = π
2.A s s u m i n g
a zero inﬂation target, the squared term, π
2 indicates that a movement below or above the inﬂation target of like
magnitude yields equal disutility.
17Rodgers (1997), p.3.
18“Remit for the Monetary Policy Committee,” letter from the Rt. Hon. Gordon Brown to Sir Edward George,
17th April 2002.
6Five members — namely those referred to in clauses (a) and (b) - are chosen internally, from within
the ranks of Bank staﬀ, hence the name insiders.T h eAct requires three of the internal members
to be the Governor and two Deputy Governors responsible for Financial Stability and Monetary
Policy respectively. These members serve ﬁve year renewable terms. The remaining two internal
appointees are chosen by the Governor following a discussion with the Chancellor, and serve three
year terms. These members are usually directors of the Bank with executive responsibility for
a given area of banking operations. Appointed directly by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the
remaining four members are chosen from outside the ranks of Bank staﬀ, hence the name outsiders,
or ‘external’ MPC members.19 In this sense, outsiders cannot be viewed as Bank ‘representatives’,
and are typically chosen from the private sector and academia. Outsiders serve renewable three
year terms.20 Given this institutional arrangement the Chancellor arguably still has a potentially
signiﬁcant bearing on the direction of UK monetary policy. In addition to powers to set and change
the inﬂation target discussed earlier, the power of appointment represents an additional vehicle for
inﬂuencing the direction of UK monetary policy.
3.3 Operational Independence
From the procedural standpoint, the Bank controls the short-term interest-rate as the key operating
target of monetary policy. In this respect, and perhaps most signiﬁcantly, Section 4(1) of the Bank
of England Act 1946 has been amended to read:
“The Treasury may from time to time give such directions to the Bank as, after consultation
with the Governor of the Bank, they think necessary in the public interest, except in relation to
monetary policy.” [words in italics added by Section 10 of the Bank of England Act 1998]
This amendment is clearly aimed at ensuring that “decision-making on monetary policy is more
eﬀective, open, accountable and free from short-term political manipulation”.21 In practice, Sec-
tion 4(1) simply means that the Bank of England does not take instructions from the Chancellor
with respect to the level of the short-term interest-rate. It is the embodiment of operational re-
sponsibility. The policy instrument used by the MPC is the rate on repurchase agreements, more
commonly known as the repo-rate. This is the interest-rate at which the Bank of England lends to
the money markets. The nature of the monetary transmission mechanism ensures that changes in
the repo-rate propagate quickly to aﬀect other short-term interest rates and ultimately long-term
rates, which eventually feed through into inﬂation and GDP growth. It is estimated that changes
in the repo-rate take two years to maximally impact inﬂation, and approximately one year for GDP
(Bank of England, 1999).
3.4 Monetary Policy Formulation and Voting Arrangements at the Bank
Monetary policy is determined by simple majority rule, following a vote on the interest-rate tabled
by the Governor of the Bank, who also chairs the MPC. In the event of a split decision, the Governor
has a casting vote. This is in accordance with Schedule 3.11 clauses (2)-(6) which specify the form
of MPC proceedings. Clauses (3)-(5) are of special relevance:
19This does not preclude members who have previously worked at the Bank from becoming external appointees.
Professor Charles Goodhart, for example, served on the MPC as an outsider, having previously been Chief Economist
at the Bank.
20Under Sir Edward George, no external member had their term renewed. However, following the depature
of Edward George from the MPC in July 2003, some outsiders appointed during his time as Chairman had their
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Composition of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee
“(3) The chair shall be taken by the Governor of the Bank or, if he is not present, the Deputy
Governor of the Bank with executive responsibility for monetary policy.
(4) Decisions shall be taken by a vote of all those members present at the meeting.
(5) In the event of a tie, the chairman shall have a second casting vote.”
Under the current operational monetary policy framework, the bank is required to publish a quar-
terly Inﬂation Report, Minutes of MPC Meetings and the individual votes of MPC members. The
composition of the MPC is stylised in Figure 1.
3.5 The Decision on the interest-rate in Practice
Decisions on the interest-rate are taken on the ﬁrst Thursday of the each month. Hosking (2000)
describes how the decision on the interest-rate is made in practice:
“...the committee gathers before 9am and the Governor kicks oﬀ with a summary of what was
discussed the day before. Members are free to chip in. Then comes the crux of the meeting.
He invites every member to speak on where they should stand and what the policy decision
should be. It is decision time...By 10.30am everyone has had their say. Unless the outcome
is unanimous, the Governor will put a proposition and ask for a show of hands. Those voting
in the minority are then given an opportunity to restate what they would do and why. The
committee then decides to put out an accompanying statement. They tend to if they think
their decision is likely to surprise the markets.”22
The voting record is then published in the Minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting,
released two weeks after the meeting.
4 MPC Performance Under Sir Edward George
Under the chairmanship of Sir Edward George, the MPC broadly met its objectives. Figure 2
shows that for the period covering June 1997-June 2003 the general trend was for interest rates to
22Hosking (2000), p.47.















































































































June 1997: MPC given responsibility for setting interest
rates and hitting inflation target of RPIX  2.5%
June 2003: Sir Edward George's terms as Governor of the 
Bank of England and Chairman of the MPC end
Figure 2.
UK RPIX Inflation, the Interest rate and the Inflation Target
fall. RPIX inﬂation remained relatively stable and close to the target rate of 2.5%. A notable
observation is that for a signiﬁcant period (May 1999 - June 2002)i n ﬂation remained below target,
which prompted some economists to speak of a deﬂationary bias inherent in monetary policy.23 On
no occasion did the rate of inﬂation deviate from its target rate suﬃciently to require the Governor
writing a letter of explanation to the Chancellor. In terms of the precise nature of the policy
decision, the repo-rate was raised on 9 occasions, lowered on 15 occasions but left unchanged 50
times.24 In this respect, Figure 2 also reveals the inertial nature of monetary policy under Sir
Edward George.25 However, when policy did change, it is hallmarked by what might be referred as
policy gradualism.26 Here, rates are gradually changed upwards or downwards in a series of small
steps rather than fewer relatively larger steps.
5 What Data is the MPC using?
In addition to the macroeconomic projections at the heart of the quarterly Inﬂation Report,M P C
members are presented with a wide range of data upon which to base a policy decision. This is
reﬂected in the Minutes, which contains sections on the ‘world economy’, ‘demand and output’,
‘money, credit and asset prices’ and ‘prices and costs’. Data on consumer conﬁdence, changes in
monetary aggregates (M0, M4), consensus forecasts of inﬂation and output, industrial production
and exchange rates are invariably referred to in these sections. Of special importance is the role
of the so-called ‘pre-MPC’ meeting which takes place on the Friday before a decision is taken. At
such meetings, bank staﬀ present various data and analyses which pertain to regional, national and
international economic developments. It is notable that not all of the information presented at pre-
23Wallis (2002) sees this as stemming from a tendency for the Bank’s suite of forecasting models to overpredict
the level of future inﬂation. One might reasonably suppose that it in practice this would lead to MPC members
prescribing higher interest rates than would be the case given a lower forecast.
24We also ﬁnd that the likelihood of a decision to tighten, loosen or leave rates unchanged being followed a quali-
tatively identical decision is 33.3%, 46.6% and 70% respectively.
25Related to this point is Blinder’s (1997) observation that a feature of monetary policy committees are policy
decisions which “tend toward the mean and to be inertial”. (p.21)
26Another name for this phenomenon is interest rate smoothing.
9MPC meetings is in the public domain. For example, the monthly report on regional developments
presented at pre-MPC meetings by the Bank of England’s regional agencies is unavailable to the
public at large.
6 Individual Policy Preferences
Table A shows (i) the individual members comprising the MPC for the sample period, (ii)t h e i r
period of appointment and the corresponding number of votes cast and (iii) whether they are insid-
ers or outsiders. This is complimented by Panels 1 - 3, which display the interest-rate preferences
of individual MPC members as revealed by their votes.27 Interest-rate preferences (%) are given on
the vertical axes. The fact that MPC members’ terms are overlapping in combination with varying
term lengths associated with diﬀerent types of member - as reﬂected in Table A - accounts for
the diﬀerent interest rate paths. Inspection of the charts reveals that although policy preferences
across members do diﬀer, members interest-rate paths are broadly similar. Members who served
for the longest periods - namely the Governor, Mervyn King, Ian Plenderleith and David Clementi
are all insiders.28
7 Group Policy Preferences
Figure 3 plots the average preferred interest rate for insiders and outsiders at each MPC meeting.
This is obtained by taking the arithmetic mean of interest rates cast by each group respectively at
each MPC meeting. With the exception of a handful of MPC meetings between October 1997 and
May 1998, Figure 3 shows that insiders preferred on average higher interest rates than outsiders.
The extent of the diﬀerences is made clearer in the accompanying chart which plots the diﬀerence
in mean interest rates preferred by insiders and outsiders.
7.1 Are Insider-Outsider Diﬀerences Statistically Signiﬁcant?
I initially test to see if the diﬀerences illustrated in Figure 3 are statistically signiﬁcant using
paired t-tests. The null hypothesis of no diﬀerence in the average preferred interest-rate in meeting
t for each group is tested against the alternative of the average preferred interest-rate in period t
being greater for insiders. More formally it is expressed as
H0 : iI,t − iO,t =0 (1)
against
H1 : iI,t − iO,t > 0 (2)
where iI,t and iO,t denote meeting t average preferred interest rates for insiders and outsiders respec-
tively. A t-statistic of t = 5.45 with a corresponding p-value of 0.000 points to rejection of H0 in
favour of H1: average preferred interest rates for outsiders are signiﬁcantly higher for insiders than
27The policy preferences of Howard Davies and Richard Lambert are not presented. Howard Davies left the MPC
after the second meeting; Richard Lambert’s appointment coincided with the ﬁnal meeting in our sample, and so only
voted once.
28Omitted from the panels are Howard Davies and Richard Lambert - it was felt that each of their series was
insuﬃciently long to warrant graphing. Davies, an insider, stands as the shortest serving MPC member, attending
only the ﬁrst two MPC meetings; Lambert’s appointment coincided with the ﬁnal meeting in the sample in June 2003,
and so only voted once.
10Insiders Period of Appointment Votes Cast
a
Eddie George* Jun 1997 - Jun 2003 74
Howard Davies** Jun 1997 - Jul 1997 2
Ian Plenderleith**** Jun 1997 - May 2002 61
Mervyn King*** Jun 1997 - Jun 2003 74
David Clementi** Sept 1997 - Aug 2002 61
John Vickers**** Jun 1998 - Sept 2000 28
Charles Bean**** Oct 2000 - Jun 2003 34
Paul Tucker**** Jun 2002 - May 2005 13
Andrew Large** Oct 2002 - Sept 2007 9
Outsiders
Charles Goodhart Jun 1997 - May 2000 36
Willem Buiter Jun 1997 - May 2000 36
De Anne Julius Sep 1997 - May 2001 45
Sir Alan Budd Dec 1997 - May 1999 18
Sushil Wadhwani Jun 1999 - May 2002 37
Stephen Nickell
 Jun 2000 - May 2006 38
Christopher Allsopp Jun 2000 - May 2003 37
Kate Barker
 Jun 2001 - May 2007 26
Marian Bell Jul 2002 - Jun 2005 12
Richard Lambert Jun 2003 - May 2006 1
a The number of votes cast by each member is identical to the total number of meetings
attended by each member. The emergency MPC meeting following the terrorist attacks
on the World Trade Centre on September 11
th 2001 are also included - an extra meeting
was held in this month.
* Governor of the Bank and Chairman of the MPC / ** Deputy Governor of the Bank for
Financial Stability / *** Deputy Governor of the Bank for Monetary Policy / ****
Executive Director of the Bank.
Reappointed for a second term commencing June 2003.
Reappointed for a second term commencing June 2004.
Members of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee, June
1997 - June 2003
Table A.
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Panel 3.
Policy Preferences of MPC Members as revealed by the voting Record
14outsiders. This points to outsiders being more dovish than their internally appointed counterparts.
In the interests of completeness, further tests were conducted conﬁrming that diﬀerences in
insider-outsider voting behaviour are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. Again, using paired t-tests29 it was
found that internalness and externalness have a statistically signiﬁcant bearing on the voting be-
haviour of insiders and outsiders. The procedure was performed as follows. MPC members were
categorised as falling into three groups - insiders, outsiders, and a third group consisting of all MPC
members irrespective of type (All members). Then, for each meeting, the percentage of votes cast
within each group for a change in the interest-rate (All changes), a tightening of the interest-rate
(Tighter policy only) and an easing of the interest-rate (Looser policy only) was calculated.
Results are shown in Table 4. Section A.1 catalogues the diﬀerences in voting behaviour between
insider and outsiders in each category. At an average MPC meeting - calculated by summing the
percentages corresponding to the type of vote cast in each category across all meetings and dividing
by the total number of meetings - insiders voted to change the interest-rate 36.15% of the time,
compared to 50% for outsiders. This diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Correspondingly,
the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant for decisions to tighten the rate, but highly signiﬁcant when it come
to voting to loosen policy. At an average MPC meeting, outsiders chose to vote for looser policy
33.45% of the time, compared with a rate of 19.19% for insiders. This diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the
1% level. Section B.1 compares each group’s propensity to vote for a change in the interest-rate
on the side of tightness or looseness. Across the ‘All member’ category, outsiders vote for looser
policy signiﬁcantly more than for tighter policy. This ﬁnding makes sense, as for the sample period
interest rates on average fell. Although insiders are just as likely to vote for a change in tighter
policy as a change in looser policy, for outsiders this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In
short, Figure 3 and Table 4 demonstrate that insiders are more hawkish and less activist than
outsiders. These diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant.
7.2 Measures of Agreement
An equally compelling ﬁnding is that insiders were in agreement with each other more so than
outsiders. To quote Edmonds (1999) insiders behaved as if they were a “cohesive homogeneous
group.”30 To substantiate this claim, I develop the following measure, Θj, which corresponds degree









,j = I,O (3)
where I and O denote insiders and outsiders respectively, σj,t denotes the standard deviation of the
desired interest-rate for members of group j in meeting t,a n dij,t the corresponding mean interest-
rate for each group in meeting t. The term
σj,t
ij,t is no more than the coeﬃcient of variation in
meeting t.L a s t l y ,l e tT stand for the total number of meetings included in the sample. Essentially,
I calculate the coeﬃcient of variation of interest rate preferences for each group at each meeting,
and then take the group average across all meetings in the sample, to proxy for the measure of
agreement within each group at the average meeting.. Accordingly, the smaller the value of Θj,t h e
lower the level of variability in interest-rate preferences expressed by members at each meeting. A
value of ΘI =0would suggest that insiders were on average in perfect agreement with each other
in every MPC meeting. The coeﬃcient of variation associated with outsider preferences over the
interest-rate - ΘO =1 .508 - is somewhat higher than those of insiders, for whom ΘI =0 .563.T h e
29All calculations were performed using STATA 8.
30Edmonds (1999), p.3.
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Mean interest rates for insiders and outsiders and associated differences
16Section A.1 - Insiders versus Outsiders
Insiders Outsiders
Significance level of 
Difference*
All Changes 36.1 50 1%
Tighter Policy Only 17.0 16.6 NS
Looser Policy Only 19.2 33.4 1%
Section B.1 - Tighter versus Looser Policy
Tighter Looser
All Members 17.0 25.5 10%
Insiders 17.0 19.2 NS
Outsiders 16.6 33.4 1%
Section A.2 - Insiders versus Outsiders
Insiders Outsiders
Significance level of 
Difference*
All Changes 37.2 50.0 1%
Tighter Policy Only 18.2 16.6 NS
Looser Policy Only 18.9 33.4 1%
Section B.2 - Tighter versus Looser Policy
Tighter Looser
All Members 17.6 26.2 NS
Insiders 18.2 18.9 1%
Outsiders 16.6 33.4 1%
Notes: *Significant differences are indicated for 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels.
NS indicates that the difference is not significant at the 10 percent level of significance
All percentages rounded to 1 decimal place.
Mean Percentage of votes for looser and tighter policy given the prevailing 
interest rate including Governor
Mean Percentage of votes for looser and tighter policy given the  prevailing 
interest rate excluding Governor
Table 4.
testing for significant differences in the propensity for insiders and
outsiders to change the repo-rate using paired t-tests
17policy preferences of outsiders at the average meeting are more diverse that those of insiders,w h o
on average, have more of a tendency to agree with each other at each MPC meeting.31 Indeed,
insiders were in total agreement with each other in 56 out of 74 meetings (i.e. when
σI,t
iI,t =0 ) .F o r
outsiders, the number was in only 31 meetings (i.e. when
σO,t




























































































































Coefficient of Variation for interest rate preferences of insiders and outsiders at
each monthly MPC meeting, June 1997 - June 2003
Whereas insiders may be seen to have well deﬁned goals and form a homogeneous cohesive
group, outsiders form more of a disparate grouping. I suggest that such observed voting behaviour
arises due to insiders being incentivised to pay more attention to each other than outsiders. In the
context of the model, this leads to insiders only weighting the policy preferences of fellow insiders in
the course of MPC deliberations, which can be explained by the presence of career concerns.32,33 As
insiders have a 5-4 in-built majority over outsiders one might reasonably posit that if insiders voted
together as a group - essentially weighting only the opinions of other insiders - they would dominate
decisions on the MPC, regardless of any opposition from their externally appointed counterparts.
This is what is seen in practice.
31Further, the ﬁnding that insiders are more likely to agree with each other more than outsiders has important
ramiﬁcations for the way the MPC is perceived. It is commonplace in the ﬁnancial press and media to portray insiders
and outsiders as two distinct groups, each with well deﬁned objectives and goals. These result serve to partially dispel
this myth.
32This may be because, as Buiter (1999) points out, the appointment of insiders to the MPC emanates from their
positions in the hierarchy of the Bank. Given the fact that insiders enjoy a numerical majority on the MPC, it is
reasonable to suppose that were an ‘institutional consensus’ to develop - which is likely in an organisation like the
Bank, which has a strong internal culture and sense of ‘corporate identity’ - insiders would dominate MPC decisions
by dint of their inbuilt majority. Put another way,
‘...every organisation develops, in short order, an in-house view, an orthodoxy, a conventional wisdom,
which it becomes increasingly diﬃcult to challenge’ (Buiter (1999),p . 1 3 . )
For this reason Buiter suggests that it would be apposite for the committee to have a majority of outsiders,o rr a t h e r ,
individuals who do not hail from a single organisation.
33In the event of a split decision, the Governor of the Bank in his role as Chairman of the MPC has a casting vote.
18Some studies of FOMC voting behaviour (i.e., Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1991))s u g g e s tt h a t
when diﬀerences in opinion arise with respect to the interest rate, the presence of career concerns
leads members to ‘revise’ their view and subsequently vote with individuals who are perceived to
have a bearing on their career path. Lawrence Roos, president of the St. Louis Federal Reserve
Bank pays testament to this view, forging a clear link between dissent voting behaviour and career
concerns:
“If one is a young, career oriented president who’s got a family to feed he tends to be more
moderate in his opposition to governors.” cf. Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990),p . 3
Also consider the opinion of Henry Wallich, a member of the Board of Governors:
“It is not a pleasant thing to have to keep dissenting...One dissents less often than
you would think. After all you are a member of a group and you want to get along
with the other members.” cf. Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990),p . 3
The message here seems to be that even when views on the interest-rate are divergent, social
forces come into play thus bringing about agreement amongst committee members. Accordingly,
members are more likely to pay attention to members of a similar type as they may have to work
with them in the future - perhaps even long after their time on serving on the committee has ended.
Disagreement now may hamper future prospects of promotion, and although members care about
the objectives of the committee, they also care about future career advancement. In this sense, the
way a member ‘performs’ on an MPC is not just measured as their ability to hit an inﬂation target,
so to speak, but judged according to a their propensity to agree with members of his or her type.
This may be particularly applicable to insiders serving on the Bank of England MPC. The voting
record for the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the MPC, demonstrates that approximately 161
2% of members’ votes
were dissents. Although MPC members are twice as likely to dissent as are FOMC members, Bank
insiders were on the winning side of a monetary policy decision 93.6% of the time, compared with
outsiders for whom the ﬁgure was 73.9%. In other words, insiders are far less likely to dissent than
outsiders, although when insiders dissent, they do so on the side of monetary tightness, whereas
outsiders do so on the side of monetary ease.
8 Estimating Members’ Reaction Functions
In this section I identify the determinants of insider and outsider voting behaviour using ordered
logit analysis.34 Reaction functions are independently estimated for insiders and outsiders using a
variety of econometric speciﬁcations. As mentioned previously, voting data obtained from Bank of
England Minutes of Monthly Meetings from between July 10th 1997 — 6th June 2003 is used. Three
types of vote are identiﬁed
1. No change: A vote for no change is deﬁned as where an MPC member prefers to maintain
the interest-rate set in the previous period.
2. Tightening: T h i si sd e ﬁned as where a member votes to raise the interest-rate set in the
previous period.
3. Loosening: T h i si sd e ﬁned as where a member votes to lower the interest-rate set in the
previous period.
34Details of the procedures used in all estimations can be found in the Appendix.
19Av o t ef o rLooser policy is coded −1, No change coded 0 and a vote for a Tightening of policy
is assigned a value of 1. Speciﬁcations are geared towards competing ideas of how the monetary
authorities set interest rates, reﬂecting views espoused in the recent literature on monetary policy
making. Further, all explanatory variables are lagged by one month to take into account the data
available to the MPC at the time of a decision. This reﬂects a methodological concern raised by
Orphanides (1998) and Tchaidze (2001) originally proposed for the estimation of reaction functions
in the monetary policy rules literature. From a methodological perspective, it is best practice to
use what Orphanides (1998) deﬁnes as real time data - namely the actual data which the MPC
was presented with and based its policy decision upon at each meeting. Clearly, it is a reasonable
to assume that MPC reaction functions are best estimated using covariates in real time, and not
estimates of macroeconomic variables which have been revised after a meeting has taken place.
In this paper, as real time data is not available, lagged data is used to proxy for what might be
referred to as ‘real time’ data - contemporaneous covariates are not used. Tchaidze (2001) identiﬁes
three key problems which should be avoided when estimating a monetary policy reaction function,
namely:
“...(i) the employment of contemporaneous rather than lagged variables as indicators of a
state of the economy; (ii) the use of cleaned up, revised data; and ﬁnally (iii) a reliance on data
which were not available at the moment of policy designing. The ﬁrst ignores the so called
“information lag”,while the last two add (or in fact, subtract) substantial noise to (from) the
fundamentals...reliance on the information actually available to policy-makers in real time is
essential for the analysis of monetary policy rules”35(emphasis added)
Similarly, Orphanides (1998) shows that using data which has undergone substantial revision distorts
understanding of past monetary policy decisions. This rule naturally extends to the estimation
of reaction functions using voting data. Accordingly, any analysis should be based on the data
available to MPC members at each meeting. Given the recency of the period under scrutiny, it is
plausible to suppose revised estimates will not diﬀer too greatly from the originals. The econometric
speciﬁcations are as follows:
8.1 The ‘Blinder’ Rule
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation is rooted in Alan Blinder’s (1998) observation that
“Central banks are often tempted to ‘follow the markets,’ that is to deliver the interest path
that the markets have embedded in asset prices.”36
The reasons for such behavior are not diﬃcult to comprehend:
“Central bankers are only human; they want to earn high marks - from whomever is handing
out the grades. While the only verdict that really matters is the verdict of history, it takes
an amazingly strong constitution to wait that long. In stark contrast, the markets provide
a kind of giant biofeedback machine that monitors and publicly evaluates the central bank’s
performance in real time. So central bankers naturally turn to the markets - or rather, they




20The argument here is not, for instance, based on MPC members following the markets due to their
f a i t hi nt h eeﬃcient markets hypothesis.38 MPC members might not necessarily subscribe to the
view that all information regarding future inﬂation and output will be fully embedded in asset
and securities prices. Rather, the implications of Blinder’s argument is that when setting the
interest-rate, the MPC follows the market knowing that a positive appraisal of policy from market
participants greatly cements their reputation as a responsible and credible monetary authority. The
view from the Bank is that market expectations do play an important role in shaping monetary
policy, as asserted by Brook, Cooper and Scholtes (2000):
“The Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is interested in ﬁnancial market partici-
pants’ expectations if future interest rates. Knowledge of such expectations helps the MPC to
predict whether a particular policy decision is likely to surprise market participants, and what
their short-term response is likely to be to a given decision. Expectations of future levels of oﬃ-
cial rates also play a key role in determining the current stance of monetary policy.”39(emphasis
added)
In light of the previous assertions, a members’ decision to loosen, tighten or leave rates unchanged
is regressed on a variable which can be reasonably supposed to capture market expectations of the
future level of interest rates, a speciﬁcation which referred to as the Blinder Rule.T h e c h o s e n
instrument is a measure of implied inﬂation b a s e do nt h ed i ﬀerence between yield curve estimates
of UK zero coupon nominal and index linked bonds at the 60 month horizon.40 The series is
constructed by calculating monthly averages of daily estimates originally calculated by Anderson
and Sleath (2002). A 60 month - as opposed to a shorter horizon is used as for reasons attested by
Anderson and Sleath (2002):
“For maturities of less than two years, estimates of both the real and nominal yield curves
have not been thought reliable, and as a result have not been used by the Bank’s Monetary
Policy Committee, nor published in the Inﬂation Report or Quarterly Bulletin.”41
For completeness, Figure 5 plots the behaviour of 2 year nominal yields and implied inﬂation on
a 60 month horizon. It can be readily observed that both series move very closely together. The
series used in Blinder Rule estimations corresponds with the dotted black line.
8.2 Taylor Rule
In this approach lagged forecasts of GDP and RPIX inﬂation are used to explain the voting behaviour
of MPC members. These speciﬁcations are chosen as they, to quote Clarida et al (2000),
“...allow the central bank to consider a broad array of information (beyond lagged information
and output) to form beliefs about the future condition of the economy, a feature which...[is] highly
realistic.”42
The choice of covariates thus comprise a forward-looking Taylor Rule information set. Forward
looking variables for GDP growth and RPIX inﬂation are obtained from HM Treasury’s Forecasts
for the UK Economy. Published monthly, this is a compendium of forecasts produced by city
38The seminal contribution is Fama (1965).
39p.392.
40These calculations have a basis in the Fisher equation.
41Anderson and Sleath (2002), p.9.
42p.151.
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Source: Bank of England
Figure 5.
UK Nominal Yields and Implied Inflation
and independent forecasters.43 For the sample period, forecasts from 47 city institutions and 19
independent forecasters are used. Each month city and independent organisations reported an
average of 19 new forecasts and 6 new forecasts respectively. Two speciﬁcations are estimated.
The ﬁrst, labelled Taylor RuleC, uses the following variables:
• Consensus forecasts of RPIX growth for the current calendar year as a percentage change on the
previous calendar year (RPIXC)
• Consensus forecasts of GDP growth for the current calendar year as a percentage change on the previous
calendar year (GDPC)
The second speciﬁcation, denoted Taylor RuleF uses forecast data on a longer time horizon,
namely
• Consensus forecasts of RPIX growth for the next calendar year as a percentage change on the current
calendar year (RPIXF)
• Consensus forecasts of GDP growth for the next calendar year as a percentage change on the current
calendar year (GDPF)
Consensus forecasts of GDP growth and RPIX inﬂation are referred to in the Minutes, in addition
to being reported in the Bank’s Inﬂation Report. If members of the MPC use ‘simple’ rules to
43City forecasters included Abn Amro Hoare Govett, Bank of America, Barclays Bank, Barclays Capital, Bridgewell,
BZW, Capital Economics, Charterhouse, Chase Manhattan, Citigroup, Credit Lyonnais, Credit Suisse First Boston,
Daiwa Europe Ltd/DIR, D M Grenfell, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Kleinwort Benson, Economic Perspectives, Friends,
Ivory and Sime, Fortis Bank, Goldman Sachs, Greenwich Natwest, Hermes, HSBC Economics & Strategy, ING
Financial Markets, ISIS Asset Management Plc, James Capel, J P Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Lombard Street, Merrill
Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Natwest Group, Natwest Markets, Nikko Europe, Norwich Union IM, Panmure Gordon,
RBSFM, Royal & Sun Alliance Investments, Salomon Brother s ,S c h r o d e r s ,S o c i e t eG e n e r a l e ,SCBW a r b u r g ,S t a n d a r d
Chartered, UBS, Warburg Dillon Read, WestLB, Panmure Gordon and Williams de Broe. Independent forecasing
organisations included BSL, Cambridge Econometrics, CBI, CEBR, DRI, Economy.com, London Business School,
EIU, Global Insight, Henley, ITEM Club, LBS, Liverpool University, NIESR, Oxford Economic Forecasting, WEFA,
EC, OECD and IMF.
22determine interest rates, then either speciﬁcation may both explain and predict MPC voting behav-
iour. I note that Tootell (1991a,b) also uses forward looking variables in the form of Greenbook
estimates of GDP growth and inﬂation as covariates - this is because
“...monetary policy aﬀects the economy only with lags, the FOMC’s expectations of GNP
growth and inﬂation can be used to determine its votes.”
As noted previously, purportedly central to the decisions on interest rates are the Bank of England’s
quarterly forecasts of inﬂation and GDP, which are published in the Inﬂation Report.H o w e v e r , t h e
quarterly nature of these forecasts make it diﬃcult to incorporate into the econometric framework as
the MPC make a decision on interest rates on a monthly basis. Even if the quarterly GDP and RPIX
forecasts contained in the inﬂation report are interpolated to form monthly variables, they have very
low explanatory power in explaining MPC voting behaviour. These regressions are therefore not
included.44 A comparison of Bank versus Consensus forecasts for GDP and inﬂation are presented
in Panel 4. Current consensus forecasts of GDP and RPIX clearly exhibit more volatility than
forecasts on a longer term horizon. The same applies to the quarterly Bank forecasts. Also, visual
inspection reveals that consensus forecasts for GDPF track the Bank’s quarterly forecasts on the 12
month horizon more closely than for the 24 month horizon. This applies to RPIXF forecasts too.
8.3 Broad Information Set
Prior to each MPC meeting, its members are presented with of a wide range of data upon which
to base a policy decision. This is reﬂected in the Minutes, which contains sections on the ‘world
economy’, ‘demand and output’, ‘money, credit and asset prices’ and ‘prices and costs’.45 Accord-
ingly, it is conjectured that MPC votes may be explained better by a using a broad data set. The
ﬁnal speciﬁcation uses the variables from the Blinder Rule and the Taylor RuleF information
set in addition to the following variables:
• 3 period moving average of the monthly annual change in the eﬀe c t i v ee x c h a n g er a t e( EER)
• Quarterly growth rate in industrial production (Industrial production)
• Monthly unemployment rate (Unemployment)
• Monthly annual change in retail sales (Retail sales)
• Monthly annual % change in narrow money growth (M0)
• Consumer conﬁdence indicator, monthly levels (Consumer conﬁdence)
The additional variables are chosen as they represent potential sources of inﬂationary pressure which
the MPC may take into account when setting the interest-rate.46 T h eb e h a v i o u ro ft h ev a r i a b l e s
used across all speciﬁcations is presented in Panel 5. When contrasting the rules in proceeding
sections I ﬁnd it useful class the Blinder Rule, Taylor RuleC and Taylor RuleF speciﬁcations - as
‘simple’ rules for monetary policy. In contrast, the Broad Information Set is an example of an
‘eclectic’ rule, as it draws upon a wide and rich set of information variables.47
44Even if the quarterly GDP and RPIX forecasts contained in the inﬂation report are interpolated to form monthly
v a r i a b l e s( t h r o u g hu s i n gaH Pﬁlter, λ =5 ), they have very low explanatory power in explaining MPC voting
behaviour.
45Full details of the variables used are provided in the appendix.
46This list is by no means exhaustive - for example, not included here are statistics related to the growth of input
prices, M4, average earnings and house prices. Estimations were carried out using these variables, but many proved
to be insigniﬁcant.
47D e t a i l sf ot h ev a r i a b l e su s e da r eg i v e ni nt h eA p p e n d i x ,Table A.1.
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Bank RPIX forecast [12 Mth Horizon]
Bank RPIX forecast [24 Mth Horizon]
Consensus forecasts [RPIXc]
Source: HMT Treasury/Bank of England
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Ordered logit Estimation Results:
Blinder Rule, Taylor Rule and Broad Information Set















Blinder -461.8 -237.9 -211.8 24.3 2 5.99 yes
Estimate both groups 
separately
TaylorC -592.2 -310.2 -272.8 18.5 3 7.81 yes
Estimate both groups 
separately
TaylorF -521.6 -264.7 -243.9 26.0 3 7.81 yes
Estimate both groups 
separately
Broad -389.2 -194.7 -174.9 39.2 10 18.3 yes
Estimate both groups 
separately
H0: Both groups should not be estimated separately
H1: Both groups should be estimated separately
LR test statistic calculated as c = -2(L(R) -L(UR)) where L(R) is the log likelihood value for the restricted model (both groups estimated
together) and L(UR) is the sum of the log -likelihood values for both groups estimated separately.
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Table 6:
Likelihood ratio tests for ordered logit estimations
9E c o n o m e t r i c R e s u l t s
Table 5 reports the estimates and diagnostics for the four speciﬁcations outlined above, all of
which are estimated separately for insiders and outsiders. At this juncture it is worth noting that
a characteristic common to limited dependent variable analysis - particularly ordered logit estima-
tion - is a diﬃculty in directly interpreting parameter estimates. This is because unlike estimation
procedures such as OLS, coeﬃcients cannot be directly interpreted as marginal eﬀects. Ultimately,
this is a consequence of imposing the constraint that the sum of probabilities across all categories
are non-negative and sum to unity. The marginal eﬀects associated with each category do not
remain constant as the values of respective independent variables change, but vary instead. It is
hence commonplace to provide estimates of marginal eﬀects holding independent variables at their
means.
Rather than adopt this approach - which produces rather unfriendly mean values - and to make
the results between groups directly comparable (to correct for diﬀerences in sample means caused
by the diﬀerent sample sizes associated with both groups), marginal eﬀects are calculated for all
speciﬁcations through holding independent variables constant at the following predetermined values:
Implied inﬂation =2 .5%; M0 =7 % ; RPIXC = RPIXF =2 .5%; GDPC = GDPF =2 .2%;
Consumer conﬁdence =0 ; Unemployment =3 .5%; EER =2 % ;Industrial production
= −1%; Retail sales =5 % . In comparing two identical speciﬁcations for insiders and outsiders,
the reported marginal eﬀects show the eﬀect of a change in an independent variable at a given
point.48 It provides a good general guide to the extent to which changes in explanatory variables
drive members’ propensity to change the interest rate for a given category. Full details of the esti-
mation procedure are provided in the appendix to this paper.
48From a practical perspective, a caveat of holding independent variables at their means, or indeed any other
values is that (i) marginal eﬀects are typically unique to those values and (ii)t h ec a l c u l a t e dchange in probability
associated with voting to loosen, tighten or leave the interest rate unchanged is at best only accurate for very (ideally
inﬁnitesimally) small changes in an independent variable. Indeed, as the magnitude of a given change, δ,i na n
independent variable becomes larger, so too does the inaccuracy of the estimated change in probability associated
with a given category. One cannot therefore be conﬁdent, for example that a given change in an independent variable
δ multiplied by the marginal eﬀects associated with a particular category will provide good approximations to changes
in probability.
27Starting with the Blinder Rule, the eﬀect of implied inﬂation is highly signiﬁcant for both in-
siders and outsiders. Marginal eﬀects show that an increase in implied inﬂation reduces the
probability that both insiders and outsiders will lower interest rates, but raises the likelihood of
leaving rates unchanged or tightening policy. However, the reduction in probability associated with
a loosening of policy is larger for outsiders than for insiders (marginal eﬀects of 0.68 vs. 0.62).
According to this speciﬁcation, outsiders are more likely to lower interest rates than insiders for
a given change in implied inﬂation. The marginal eﬀects for tightening show the reverse - in-
siders are more likely to raise interest rates than outsiders for a corresponding change in implied
inﬂation. This speciﬁcation therefore points to asymmetries in policy preferences between the two
groups. Insiders are comparatively more hawkish than their externally appointed counterparts, a
ﬁnding which conﬁrms the analyses of previous sections. All of the marginal eﬀects are signiﬁcant,
although both the Cragg-Uhler and McFadden measures or R2 (denoted R2 (C-U)a n dR2 (M)
respectively) are only moderately high. However, under both goodness-of-ﬁt criteria, the Blinder
Rule speciﬁcation still performs better than either of the Taylor Rule speciﬁcations, to which I now
turn.
In Taylor RuleC, consensus forecasts of RPIX growth for the current calendar year as a percent-
age change on the previous calendar year (RPIXC) are insigniﬁcant across both groups, although
forecasts of current GDP growth do seem to play a role. Marginal eﬀects indicate that increases in
RPIXC decrease the probability that both insiders and outsiders will lower interest rates (0.10 vs.
0.15), but raise the probability of leaving rates unchanged or tightening policy. The same applies
to GDPF. Nevertheless, although the marginal eﬀects across all categories are qualitatively similar
to those in the Blinder Rule, they are far less pronounced. Further, some of the marginal eﬀects
are not statistically diﬀerent to zero. The ﬁnal Taylor Rule speciﬁcation, Taylor RuleF, which uses
forecasts on a longer (12 month) horizon performs better than Taylor RuleC, with respect to both
the signiﬁcance and size of the marginal eﬀects, and measures of pseudo R2. This result may indi-
cate that MPC members are quite forward looking when setting policy, and use longer as opposed
to relatively shorter forecasting horizons.49 In both groups, the coeﬃcients and marginal eﬀects
are generally highly signiﬁcant, although for insiders, the marginal eﬀects for no change are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for RPIXF and GDPF. For outsiders, the marginal eﬀects seem
to be more pronounced than for insiders for changes in GDPF. This suggests that the behaviour
of GDP plays more of an inﬂuential role in setting the interest rate for outsiders.
In the case of the Broad Information Set the diagnostics suggest that it performs best in ex-
plaining the voting behaviour of MPC members. Both measures of R2 are moderate to high, and
signiﬁcantly higher than those under simple rules. However, although for both groups, EER and
GDPF have the wrong signs. Unemployment, although statistically signiﬁcant for insiders is not
signiﬁcant for outsiders. In both groups, the marginal eﬀects are clearly dominated by the eﬀect
of Implied inﬂation, where clear asymmetries in policy can be seen as emerging. The nature of
the asymmetry again points to outsiders being more dovish than insiders. The only variable other
than Implied inﬂation which has statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients and marginal eﬀects across
both groups is M0, which also has the expected signs. Table 6 displays the results of likelihood
ratio tests conducted to test the hypothesis that each speciﬁcation should be estimated separately
for insiders and outsiders. The hypothesis was accepted in every case.
All speciﬁcations evidence a very strong link between implied inﬂation and interest rates.
However, it might be the case that decisions on the interest-rate are not driven by implied inﬂa-
49This suggests that policymakers practice inﬂation forecast targetting as opposed to just inﬂation targetting.
28tion, but vice versa. Market participants may just be extremely good at predicting future monetary
policy decisions. Using data on the actual policy decisions taken by the MPC and rates of implied
inﬂation, Granger causality tests suggest that the direction of causality runs from implied inﬂation
to the repo-rate. Full results are shown in Table A.3 in the Appendix. Using up to seven lags, the
null hypothesis that the repo-rate does not Granger-cause changes in inﬂation is accepted in every
instance. Conversely, the null hypothesis that implied-inﬂation does not Granger-cause changes in
the repo-rate cannot be rejected for every lag. This result strengthens the case for a Blinder Rule,
namely that the MPC merely looks to the markets to set the interest rates.
10 Predicting the Votes of MPC Members
In this section the ability of each speciﬁcation to predict the votes of insiders and outsiders is
analysed. This procedure is implemented by calculating the ﬁtted values in each category for
each vote, and choosing the category associated with the highest value for each vote. As the
ﬁtted values are probabilities, this process merely involves choosing the category with the highest
probability. Following Chevapatrakul et al (2001), directional predictions are formally stated as
zl = mi fP j =m a x ( P0,P 1,P 2) (4)
where no change in policy is predicted if P0 =m a x ( P0,P 1,P 2), a tightening of policy is predicted
if P1 =m a x ( P0,P 1,P 2) and looser policy is predicted if P2 =m a x ( P0,P 1,P 2). In other words, the
prediction is given by choosing the probability with the highest value.
Table 7 looks at the predictive performance of each speciﬁcation. Part A details the in-sample
voting predictions for insiders and outsiders based on ordered logit estimations. Numbers in brack-
ets (.) show the number of correct voting predictions within each category. Consider the Blinder
Rule where insiders voted for looser policy 71 times (Actual Outcomes). The Blinder Rule spec-
iﬁcation predicted 40 votes for looser policy, of which 20 were correct. What immediately becomes
apparent is the tendency inherent in all speciﬁcations to over-predict no change in policy. This
comes at the expense of under-predicting decisions to loosen or tighten interest rates, an outcome
which obtains for both insiders and outsiders. The Taylor RuleC speciﬁcation performs particularly
poorly, and predicts that all votes for insiders will be to leave policy unchanged.
Parts B and C allow for the identiﬁcation of the model which performs best in predicting the
voting behaviour of insiders and outsiders. Part B shows the number of correct decisions expressed
as a percentage of actual decisions. Consider the Blinder Rule for insiders again, and recall that
part A shows that of 40 predictions for loosed policy, only 20 were correct. The Blinder Rule
thus has a 20
71 × 100 = 28.2% success rate in predicting a vote cast for looser policy. Under this
criteria, the Broad Information Set performs best. Further, it seems more able to predict votes for
change for insiders than outsiders. The Blinder Rule is better at predicting votes cast for looser
for outsiders than insiders, with the reverse being true for votes for tighter policy. However, some
care should be taken when interpreting these results. Note that although the Taylor RuleC enjoys
a 64% success rate in predicting votes for no change in policy for insiders, it does not predict any
votes in favour of changing the interest rate, in either direction. All votes predict no change in
policy.
Numbers in square brackets [.] show the conditional probability (expressed as a percentage)
of a prediction made within a particular category being correct. This is calculated by dividing






Insiders Loosen 71 40* (20)** 0 (0) 30 (19) 45 (32)
No change 228 277 (190) 356 (228) 307 (213) 280 (210)
Tighten 57 39 (21) 0 (0) 19 (15) 31 (26)
Outsiders Loosen 99 96 (60) 44 (18) 56 (35) 100 (75)
No change 145 162 (92) 242 (119) 211 (114) 153 (112)






Insiders Loosen 71 28.2
★ [50]
★★ 0 [0] 26.8 [63.3] 45.1 [71.1]
No change 228 83.3 [68.6] 100 [64.0] 93.4 [69.4] 92.1 [75]
Tighten 57 36.8 [53.8] 0 [0] 26.3 [78.9] 45.6 [83.9]
Outsiders Loosen 99 60.6 [62.5] 18.2 [40.9] 35.4 [62.5] 75.8 [75]
No change 145 63.4 [56.8] 82.1 [49.2] 78.6 [54.0] 77.2 [73.2]













★ Part B shows the number of correct decisions expressed as a percentage of actual decisions. For example, consider the Blinder rule
for insiders again, recalling that part A shows that of 40 predictions for looser policy, only 20 were correct. The Blinder rule thus has
a ((20)/(71))×100=28.2% success rate in predicting a vote cast for looser policy.
★★ Figures in square brackets [.] show the
conditional probability (expressed as a percentage) of a prediction made within a particular category being correct. This is calculated
by dividing the number of correct predictions within each category by the total number of predictions for that category. For
instance, to use the Blinder rule for insiders again, the likelihood of a prediction for looser policy being correct given that the
prediction is for looser policy is calculated as Prob(Correct|Loosen)×100=(20/40)×100=50%.  
Notes: Actual Outcomes refers to the total number of votes cast by Insiders and Outsiders to loosen, leave unchanged or tighten
the repo-rate. As an example, the total number of votes cast by insiders to loosen the interest rate over the sample period is 71. *In
A. Voting Predictions, numbers in columns show the number of in-sample predictions under each rule. ** Figures in round
brackets (.) show the number of correct voting predictions within each category (Loosen/No Change/Tighten)). For instance,
consider the Blinder Rule where insiders voted for looser policy 71 times (Actual Outcomes). The Blinder Rule specification
predicts 40 votes for looser policy, of which 20 were correct.
 Part C pools all of the correct predictions together for each group (insiders and outsiders) irrespective of category (Loosen/No
Change/Tighten) and divides this number by the total number of votes cast by each group. For instance, the Blinder Rule
specification for insiders predicts 231out of 356 votes correctly, which corresponds to a (231/356)*100=64.9% success rate. These






































In-Sample voting predictions based on ordered logit estimates
30category. Again, the Broad Information Set performs best - for example, the results show that a
prediction by the model to tighten interest rates has an 83.9% chance of being correct. Finally, part
C pools all of the correct predictions together for each group irrespective of category and divides this
number by the total number of votes cast by each group. The Broad Information Set out-performs
the other categories. For insiders, 75.3% of predicted votes were correct; for outsiders the ﬁgure was
comparable at 74.1%. The more parsimonious speciﬁcations are very bad at correctly predicting
the votes of outsiders; for insiders this is not necessarily the case. This may be attributable to the
ﬁnding that at any given MPC meeting, the interest rate preferences of outsiders are more widely
dispersed than for insiders (see Figure 4). A conclusion that might be drawn from this is that
outsiders are more ‘eclectic’ in their approach to setting monetary policy - the additional variables
used in the Broad Information Set are relatively more important to outsiders than insiders. This
may for example explain why the marginal eﬀects for the extra variables are, with the exception of
Unemployment, higher for outsiders across all categories.
11 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have demonstrated that internalness and externalness is a signiﬁcant factor is ex-
plaining the voting behaviour of MPC members. In s i d e r sa r es h o w nt ob em o r eh a w k i s ht h a nt h e i r
externally appointed counterparts, preferring ceteris paribus higher interest rates than outsiders.
Further, insiders have a greater propensity for leaving interest rates unchanged. On a more general
level, preliminary analysis of the timing of MPC decisions also demonstrates that if the interest rate
is going to change, it is more likely to be changed in an Inﬂation Report month than at any other
time.
The results of ordered logit analysis provide insight into the economic factors driving members’
voting decisions. A ﬁrst conclusion is the seemingly crucial role of forward looking variables in set-
ting interest rates for insiders and outsiders. Both the Blinder Rule and Taylor RuleF speciﬁcation
out-perform the Taylor RuleC speciﬁcation by a signiﬁc a n tm a r g i n . T h i si sr e ﬂected in the associ-
ated measures of pseudo-R2 and in-sample predictions presented in Table 7. Further, it is notable
that whereas all parameters in the Blinder Rule and and Taylor RuleF are statistically signiﬁcant,
this is not the case for the Taylor RuleC. Marginal eﬀects in the ‘simple’ rule speciﬁcations have
the expected signs with respect to theoretical priors for both groups. Yet compared to the simple
rules, the Broad Information Set speciﬁcation is clearly superior, a ﬁnding which applies to both
insiders and outsiders. Each group appears to use a broad array of variables when setting interest
rates, which has implications for the view that the Bank merely follows the market or uses Taylor
Rules. However, when one looks to the parameter estimates for implied inﬂation in the Broad
Information Set, it is clearly seen to be the most inﬂuential variable. This suggests that although
MPC members use an eclectic rule when setting monetary policy, market expectations of inﬂation
play a dominant role.
Based on the results presented in this paper, further research in this area is has the potential
to be both fruitful and policy relevant. An key ﬁnding is that outsiders prefer systematically lower
interest rates than insiders. This begs the question of whether the appointments procedure is
open to political manipulation by the Chancellor of the Exchequer - does he, for example choose
external MPC members on the basis of their being doves, or are such dovish tendencies attributable
to chance? A further ﬁnding is the extent to which monetary policy would diﬀer if outsiders formed
the majority of members. Under such a regime, it is not implausible to suppose that monetary
policy would be characterised by lower interest rates with a correspondingly higher rate of economic
growth. It must be emphasised however that the approach adopted in this paper approach lies
31well within the ‘reaction function’ genre. Put another way, the focus has been on determining how
MPC members respond to changes in economic conditions. Other lines of investigation such as the
propensity of MPC members to dissent and the eﬀects of career backgrounds on such behaviour
- lines of investigation associated with the ‘partisan theory of politics’ literature - is discussed in
Spencer (2005b).
3212 Appendix
12.A The Ordered Logit Model
A common thread running through studies of monetary policy decision making is the use of limited
dependent variable models in the estimation of reaction functions. From the mathematical per-
spective, the logit model has the advantage being computationally less burdensome than the probit
model, which is based on the cumulative normal distribution. This section provides a rudimentary
treatment of the ordered logit model geared speciﬁcally to the case of 3 outcomes, reﬂecting the
choice faced by members of an MPC to tighten, loosen or leave interest rates unchanged. For more
complete expositions of the ordered logit model see Maddala (1983), Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989),
Cramer (1991) and Greene (1992).
For the ordered logit model the choice between M mutually exclusive alternatives has an im-
plicitly logical ordering.50,51 For members of an MPC faced with 3 choices, the ordered logit model




iβ + εi (7)
yi = −1 if y∗
i ≤ γ1
yi =0if γ1 <y ∗




i is a stacked m × 1 vector of −1s, 0s and 1s corresponding to members’ votes to tighten,
loosen or leave interest rates unchanged given the rate set in the previous period. xi is a m × h
matrix containing h independent variables capturing the information sets of MPC members at the
time each vote was cast, and β is a 1 × h vector parameter estimates.52 The speciﬁcation given



















iβ) − Φ(γj−1 − x
0
iβ)] (10)
50T h i sm o d e li sa l s or e f e r r e dt oa st h eproportional odds model. It recently came to the attention of the author that
it is possible in STATA to estimate a generalised version of the ordered logit model, which relaxes the proportional
odds assumption. Created by Vincent Kang Fu of the Department of Sociology, University of Utah, it is available as
the gologit module and can be installed from within STATA by typing “ssc install gologit”.
51It is important to note here the diﬀerence between ordered logit model and the ordered probit model. In the























52The ordered logit model is a more parsimonious speciﬁcation than the multinomial logit model, given there are
fewer parameters to be estimated.
33where Zi,j =1if the ith vote falls in the jth category, and Zi,j =0if not, across the j = {0,1,2}
outcomes. Letting Φ denote the cumulative standard logistic function it follows that
Pr(Zi,j =1 )=[ Φ(γj − x
0
iβ) − Φ(γj−1 − x
0
iβ)] (11)
In the case of three ordered outcomes, the probability that y∗
i assumes a particular value for the
three categories is deﬁned as:
Looser policy:







No change in policy:
P(Zi =0 ) = [ Φ(γ2 − x
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where γ1 and γ2 are embody the lower and upper cut oﬀ points respectively.
12.A.1 Marginal Eﬀects for the Ordered Logit Model
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Unlike the linear probability model, marginal eﬀects vary across probabilities, and sum to zero
across categories.53
12.A.2 Measuring the Goodness of Fit








where L(β1,β2) is the likelihood function maximized with respect to all of the parameters in the
model, β1,β2, including the constant terms54, γ1 and γ2,a n dL(γ1,γ2) denoting the maximum of
the likelihood function maximized with respect to the constant terms only.55 The term m denotes
the total number of observations. However, this measure of ﬁts u ﬀers from severely underestimating
the measure of ﬁt of the regression: even if the model has perfect ﬁt, R2 may be well below 1.
For this reason, it is apposite to employ McFadden’s (1974) measure of goodness-of-ﬁt, pseudo-R2,





An alternative measure of goodness of ﬁt, also referred to as pseudo-R2 is provided by Cragg-Uhler











where the same notational deﬁnitions used for McFadden’s (1974) measure of R2,ρ M are employed.
An alternative approach is to conduct a likelihood ratio test. To test for the joint signiﬁcance








which is distributed as a Chi-squared variate with q degrees of freedom and δ restrictions. This
formula lends itself to a more general setting, with the maximized log likelihood values for unre-
stricted and restricted versions of the model corresponding to the denominator and the numerator
53These results also apply to the multinomial logit model.
54In the case of the ordered logit model the constant terms can be interpreted as cutoﬀ points.
55This implies restricting the values of all explanatory variables to zero. In the ordered logit model this is equivalent
to just estimating cutoﬀ points.
56This measure is also referred to as McFadden’s likelihood ratio index.
35respectively. As one might expect, the null of no joint signiﬁcance against the alternative hypothesis
that at least one explanatory variable is signiﬁcant is tested.
3612.B The GMT index
To provide the reader with an appreciation of the extent to which the shift to operational indepen-
dence has increased the degree of independence enjoyed by the Bank I use the deﬁnitions provided
by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991).57,58 Speciﬁcally, I compare the levels of independence
before and after the Act. Gauging the degree of independence of a monetary institution is not an
exact science, and indices measuring the degree of central bank independence typically rely on what
one author has termed ‘the statute reading methodology’.59 That is, one largely determines the
independence of a central bank with explicit reference to its statutes. GMT delineate between two
types of independence which a monetary institution may enjoy - political independence and economic
independence.60 The political independence of a central bank is associated “with how the members
of the central bank board are appointed, its relationship with government and its responsibilities”.
So-called economic independence concerns the ability of a central bank to use the instruments of
monetary policy without interference from governmental bodies or institutions. To see how the
degree of independence has changed pre and post the shift to operational independence, refer to
Table A.1. Prima face, the Bank has retained a low level of political independence, in spite of
the shift to operational independence. For example, the maximum term length an MPC member
may be appointed for is ﬁve years. Further, the Government is still responsible for appointing
the Governor.Institutional and regulatory changes with regard to UK banking supervision and debt
management have increased the level of economic independence enjoyed by the Bank. The creation
of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) - a body independent of the Bank of England responsible
for UK banking supervision — coincided with the shift to operational independence in 1997,61 and
the establishment of the UK Debt Management Oﬃce (DMO) followed shortly afterwards.
57Hereafter GMT.
58I do not propose to provide a complete discussion of the GMT index. The interested reader is referred their
original paper. Alternatively, for an updated GMT index the reader is referred to Hudson et al (2001).
59See Forder (1995). Although highly critical of many methodologies used to contruct central bank indices, Forder
f a i l st oo ﬀer an alternative method for measuring the degree of autonomy of monetary institutions.
60The introduction of the Act is notable in as far as it redeﬁnes the status of the Bank vis-à-vis goal and instrument
independence. The Bank has instrument independence in that it sets short-term and key interest rates without
interference from any other institutions; conversely, it does not have goal independence as the main objective of
maintaining price stability set out in the Act can only be changed at the discretion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
For an exegesis of the distinction between goal and instrument independence see Debelle and Fisher (1994). We
however, use the criteria used by GMT.
61Essentially, Banking supervision is no longer entrusted to the Bank of England. This move eliminates a possible
conﬂict of interest emanating from when a central bank has the responsibility to set the discount rate and is also
responsible for banking supervision. Hudson et al (2001) bring this point home:
“If banking failures could be triggered by an increase in the interest-rate, central bank might be
unwilling to undertake monetary policy which is required at the macroeconomic level.” p.5.
Furthermore,
“...ifbankingfailuresdidoccur,thecentralbankmightberegardedasresponsible,andthiscould
undermine its reputation.” (Ibid)
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Pre-1998 Act * 1
Post-1998 Act * * * 3




[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
P r e - 1 9 9 8  A c t **** * 5
P o s t - 1 9 9 8  A c t ****** *  * 8
Source: Table adapted from Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991). Pre-1998 Act levels of independence
b a s e do nt h o s eg i v e ni nG r i l l i ,M a s c i a n d a r oa n dT a b e llini (1991). Post-1998 Act levels of independence
based on Hudson, Pearlman and Sarantis (2001).
Notes: (1) Direct credit facility: not automatic; (2) Direct credit facility: market interest rate; (3) Direct
credit facility: temporary; (4) Direct credit facility: limited amount (5) Central bank does not participate in
primary market for public debt; (6) Discount rate set by central bank; (7)Banking supervision not entrusted
to the central bank (**) or not entrusted to the central bank alone (*); (8) Overall index of economic
independence calculated by summing the number of stars in each row through (1) - (7). 







Notes: (1) Governor not appointed by government; (2) Governor appointed for >5 years; (3) All the board
not appointed by the government; (4) Board appointed for >5 years; (5) No mandatory participation of
government representative in the board; (6) No government approval of monetary policy formulation is
required; (7) Statutory requirements that central bank pursues monetary stability amongst its goals; (8) Legal
provisions that strengthen the central bank's position in conflicts with the government are present; (9)
Overall index of political independence calculated by summing the number of stars in each row through (1)
- (8) 
Table A.1.
GMT Index of Bank of England Political and Economic Independence
3812.C List of Variables
Constructed variables
Name Description Constructed from: Source Mnemonic
EER
3 period moving average 
of the monthly annual 
change in the effective 
exchange rate.
UK sterling (£) effective 





Quarterly growth rate in 
industrial production.
UK Industrial production 






UK unemployment rate, 
seasonally adjusted. Datastream UKUN%TOTQ
Retail sales
Monthly annual change in 
retail sales.
UK retail sales volume index, 
seasonally adjusted. Datastream UKODD015G
M0
Monthly annual  % 
change in narrow money 
growth.
UK M0 money supply 
monthly calendar levels, 







UK consumer confidence 
indicator, seasonally adjusted. Datastream UKCNFCONQ
RPIXC
Consensus forecasts of 
RPIX growth for the 
curent calendar year as a 
percentage change on the 
previous calendar year.
Average of new monthly 
forecasts for RPIX growth 







No mnemonic.  Forecasters' 
projections of movements is 
series ABMI, found in 
National Accounts Table 
C2.
GDPC
Consensus forecasts of 
GDP growth for the 
curent calendar year as a 
percentage change on the 
previous calendar year.
Average of new monthly 
estimates of current GDP 







No mnemonic.  Forecasters' 
projections of movements is 
series CDKQ, found in 
ONS Consumer Prices release, 
Table 1.
RPIXF
Consensus forecasts of 
RPIX growth for the next 
calendar year as a 
percentage change on the 
current calendar year.
Average of new monthly 
estimates of future RPIX 







No mnemonic.  Forecasters' 
projections of movements is 
series ABMI, found in 
National Accounts Table 
C2.
GDPF
Consensus forecasts of 
GDP growth for the next 
calendar year as a 
percentage change on the 
current calendar year.
Average of new monthly 
estimates of future GDP 







No mnemonic.  Forecasters' 
projections of movements is 
series CDKQ, found in 
ONS Consumer Prices release, 
Table 1.
Implied inflation
Implied RPI inflation 
based on nominal spot 
rates at 60 months 
maturity.
Estimates of implied RPI 
inflation using yield curve 
data based on calculations by 




Description of Variables used in Econometric Estimation
3912.D Results for Granger Causality Tests
Causality between the repo rate and market expectations of inflation*
H0: The repo rate does not Granger Cause changes in implied inflation
Lags Obs F-Statistic p-value
1 72 1.61 0.21
2 71 0.18 0.83
3 70 1.24 0.30
4 69 1.19 0.33
5 68 2.11 0.08
6 67 2.00 0.08
7 66 1.76 0.12
H0: Implied inflation does not Granger Cause changes in the repo rate
Lags Obs F-Statistic p-value
1 72 44.33 0.00
2 71 11.65 0.00
3 70 6.06 0.00
4 69 4.49 0.00
5 68 3.44 0.01
6 67 5.21 0.00
7 66 5.21 0.00
*5 year market expectations of implied inflation based on nominal zero coupon yields for 
UK government bonds.  Source: Bank of England
Table A.3.
Granger Causality Tests: repo-rate vs. Implied inflation
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